A Stained Glass Ceiling? Mitt Romney and Mormonism by Campbell, David E
Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social 
Sciences 
Volume 18 Issue 1 Article 3 
2015 
A Stained Glass Ceiling? Mitt Romney and Mormonism 
David E. Campbell 
University of Notre Dame 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jiass 
 Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Campbell, David E. (2015) "A Stained Glass Ceiling? Mitt Romney and Mormonism," Journal of the Indiana 
Academy of the Social Sciences: Vol. 18 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. 
Retrieved from: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jiass/vol18/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@butler.edu. 
1 
Keynote Address from the 85th Annual Meeting of the Indiana Academy of the 
Social Sciences 
A Stained-Glass Ceiling? Mitt Romney and Mormonism*,† 
DAVID E. CAMPBELL 
University of Notre Dame 
ABSTRACT 
Did Mitt Romney’s religion—Mormonism—help or hurt him in his 
campaigns for the presidency? While Romney’s religious affiliation was 
generally viewed as an electoral liability, Americans’ ambivalence about 
Mormons presented the possibility that, depending on framing, it could be 
neutralized or could perhaps even become a political asset. Survey 
experiments during both Romney’s 2008 and 2012 campaigns suggest that 
although Romney’s religion was a detriment when he ran the first time, it 
had largely ceased to be an issue in 2012. Although Mormonism did not 
have much effect on Romney’s performance at the polls in the general 
election of 2012, however, Romney’s candidacy has had an effect on 
perceptions of Mormonism. In the wake of his campaign, attitudes toward 
Mormons have become politically polarized, with Republicans holding a 
far more positive view of them than Democrats, with Independents in the 
middle.  
KEY WORDS  2012 Presidential Election; Mormonism; Mitt Romney;  
Religious Tolerance 
Much is rightly made of John F. Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 presidential election as a 
giant leap for religious tolerance in America. In winning that election, Kennedy 
demonstrated that the Constitution’s promise that there shall be no religious test for office 
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was true in fact as well as law, at least for Catholics. Although Kennedy was the first 
Catholic to win, however, he was not the first to run. That distinction belongs to Al 
Smith, who ran as the Democratic presidential nominee in 1928. During the 1928 
campaign, Smith faced virulent anti-Catholicism in a landslide loss to Herbert Hoover 
(Prendergrast 1999). There were many reasons for Smith’s loss, so it would not be 
accurate to pin it all on his religion, but neither should we dismiss the hostility and even 
bigotry directed toward him because of his religion. 
As the first member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS)—a 
Mormon—to run as a major party nominee in a general presidential election, is Mitt 
Romney better described as the Mormons’ John F. Kennedy or their Al Smith? Was he 
like Smith, in that his candidacy fanned the flames of religious hostility, or, 
notwithstanding his loss at the polls, was he more like Kennedy, in that he broke through 
a stained-glass ceiling? 
In answering this question, I will draw on research I have done in collaboration 
with John Green and Quin Monson and published in our book Seeking the Promised 
Land: Mormons and American Politics (Cambridge University Press). I refer interested 
readers to our book for a more thorough discussion of themes introduced here.  
I begin by noting that, although Romney’s Mormonism was widely seen as an 
electoral liability—a point reinforced by our data presented—it also had the potential to 
be an asset. For example, consider the following incident in the 2012 campaign. In the 
fall of 2012, Romney was in the midst of his tight presidential race against Barack 
Obama. Although buoyed by his strong performance in the first presidential debate, 
Romney faced continued criticism for comments he had made at a private fundraiser in 
which he had dismissed 47 percent of Americans as “dependent upon government, who 
believe that they are victims . . . and so my job is not to worry about those people. I’ll 
never convince them that they should take personal responsibility for their lives” (New 
York Times 2012). At the end of the second presidential debate, the two candidates were 
asked the following question by an audience member: 
What do you believe is the biggest misperception that the 
American people have about you as a man and a candidate? 
Using specific examples, can you take this opportunity to 
debunk that misperception and set us straight? 
Romney went first. In seeking to defuse criticism for his “47 percent” comment, he began 
by saying, “I care about 100 percent of the American people.” After underscoring that 
point, he went on to say,  
[M]y passion probably flows from the fact that I believe in 
God. And I believe we're all children of the same God. I 
believe we have a responsibility to care for one another. I—
I served as a missionary for my church. I served as a pastor 
in my congregation for about 10 years. I've sat across the 
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table from people who were out of work and worked with 
them to try and find new work or to help them through 
tough times. (ABC News 2012) 
Romney was referencing one of the most potentially controversial parts of his biography, 
his Mormonism, to rebut one of the most damaging charges leveled against him, that he 
was a callous elitist. In doing so, he was emphasizing the universalistic aspects of his 
faith, which in a highly religious nation like the United States had the potential to soften 
his image and thus win votes. 
This example reminds us that Mormonism presents a paradox. Mormonism is the 
“quintessentially American religion” (Moore 1986) while simultaneously engendering 
negative reactions both from members of other faiths—especially evangelical 
Protestants—and secularists. Accordingly, my colleagues and I have found that 
Americans’ perceptions of Mormons are a mix of both positive and negative stereotypes. 
(See chapter 7 of Seeking the Promised Land for more details.) Given that Mormonism is 
the proverbial double-edged sword, in sifting through the evidence from Romney’s two 
presidential campaigns, our question is whether, on balance, Mormonism did more to 
help or harm his prospects at the polls.  
THE 2008 CAMPAIGN 
In Romney’s debut performance during the 2008 Republican primaries, his Mormonism 
was a significant detriment in the eyes of many voters. Political science theory 
illuminates why voters would react strongly to the “peculiar” religious background of a 
relatively unknown candidate running in the primary process. Voters typically have little 
information about the candidates running. Not only are the candidates often unfamiliar, 
but because they are all in the same party, primary voters cannot glean any information 
from the party label as in a general election. In such an environment, a little bit of 
information can have an outsized impact on how voters perceive a candidate. Political 
scientist Samuel Popkin (1994) has memorably described the “low information 
rationality” that characterizes voters’ behavior during primaries. Voters receive 
information—often limited—about candidates. If they accept the information as reliable, 
it is stored for retrieval until needed for a decision. At the decision point, people sample 
across the stored information to form an opinion (Zaller 1992). For candidates with a 
long track record in public life (e.g., Hillary Clinton), most voters will already have a lot 
of stored information. One more piece of information, like her religious affiliation, is not 
likely to make much difference—a small pebble in a large pond. For lesser known 
candidates, one piece of information, particularly novel information, will have a far 
greater impact, like a large rock in a small pond, and if that information is membership in 
a distinctive, even controversial, religion, it is likely to make a big splash. 
During the 2008 primaries, we tested how voters responded to information about 
Mitt Romney’s background in the LDS Church.1 In particular, we examined how voters 
reacted to different ways of framing Mormonism. We did so while the primaries were 
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underway, when Romney was still relatively unknown and a viable candidate for the 
Republican nomination.2 
We randomly assigned respondents (roughly 200 each) to read different descriptions 
of Mitt Romney. Everyone received this positive boilerplate description of him:  
As you know, Mitt Romney is running for president. He is a 
successful businessman, a former governor of Massachusetts, 
and the head of the 2002 Winter Olympics. He has been 
married for thirty-nine years and raised five sons. 
Some respondents were randomly chosen to receive more information, which 
was added immediately following the information about his personal background. 
One group learned that Romney “has been a local leader in his church,” while another 
learned that he has been a local leader of “the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, often called the Mormon Church.” After reading the description of Romney, 
all respondents were asked whether the preceding information made them more or 
less likely to vote for him. 
This method enabled us to compare the reactions of voters who received only 
the boilerplate biography (control group) to those who received the additional 
information about his religion. By comparing the two groups, we determined if 
additional information about Romney’s religion made voters more or less likely to 
vote for him. Recall that at this time, Romney was a newcomer on the national 
political scene, so for many voters, our information would have made a large splash.  
As shown in Figure 1, the information that Romney was a leader in the 
Mormon Church had a substantially negative effect on the likelihood of participants 
voting for him.3 The figure compares the reaction of respondents in the control 
group—who, recall, read nothing about Romney’s religion—to those who received 
information about his religion. As shown in the figure, when Romney’s church was 
not identified, voters registered no statistically significant reaction, but when his 
affiliation with the Mormon Church was explicitly mentioned, Romney’s support 
dropped by roughly 32 percentage points.  
Figure 1 also displays the results for evangelicals and for people with no 
religious affiliation (the “nones”). Tension exists between Mormons and other 
religions (evangelicals) and between Mormons and secular society (nones). Both 
groups have a slightly more negative reaction to Romney’s Mormonism than does the 
general population. Not surprisingly, evangelicals do not have a negative reaction 
upon reading that Romney has been a leader in his church when it remains 
unidentified, while nones have a negative reaction to the unnamed church, 
approaching statistical significance.4  
Romney was not the only candidate in the 2008 primary season to face questions 
about his religious background. Among his Republican opponents, Mike Huckabee was 
an ordained Southern Baptist pastor, which might have been a problem for some voters. 
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On the Democratic side, Barack Obama faced the double whammy of controversial 
comments made by the pastor of his Chicago church, Jeremiah Wright, and the rumor 
that he was actually a Muslim. To gauge the relative impact of concerns about Romney’s 
LDS background compared to the concerns raised about other candidates, we conducted a 
parallel set of experiments during the primary season. Because Romney, Huckabee, and 
Obama were all relatively unknown to most voters, for contrast, we also tested voters’ 
reactions to information about the religious background of Hillary Clinton, as she was 
extremely well known.  
Figure 1. Reactions to Romney's Religion, January 2008 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Source: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (2008). 
In each case, members of the control group read a boilerplate description of 
the candidate while another randomly selected group read the same description with 
additional information about the candidate’s religion. As with the Romney 
experiments, we limited our descriptions to information that was factually correct, 
using language with a neutral tone. This undoubtedly limited the effects we 
observed, as far more incendiary, and often inaccurate, information circulates during 
a political campaign.5 
Figure 2 displays how each description affected voters’ likelihood to vote for the 
candidate in question. Not surprisingly, the effect for Clinton was small and statistically 
insignificant. Not only did most Americans already have their minds made up about her, 
but Clinton’s background as a United Methodist, a mainline Protestant denomination, 
was unlikely to cause voters as much concern as the other candidates’ religions. 
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Huckabee’s background as a Southern Baptist minister triggered a significant 
negative reaction but, at 13 percentage points, was far less than the concern 
elicited by disclosure of Romney’s Mormonism. Voters’ reaction to information 
about Obama’s alleged Muslim background and his pastor were highly 
negative—a little smaller and the latter a little larger, respectively, than the 
“Mormon effect.”6 All told, in 2008, Romney’s Mormonism was as large a 
political liability for him as were two of the most explosive charges leveled 
against Barack Obama.  
Figure 2. Reactions to Presidential Candidates’ Religion, 2008 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Source: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (2008). 
Historically, Democrats have had a stronger aversion to Mormon 
presidential candidates than have Republicans. That pattern was borne out in our 
Romney experiment, as the Mormon effect for Republicans was a drop of 25 
percentage points, compared to 36 points for Democrats.7 Among Democrats, 
there was also a negative and statistically significant reaction to the description 
of Romney as a leader in his unnamed church, albeit smaller than the Mormon 
effect (13 percentage points). 
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CONTACT AND KNOWLEDGE  
Even though this experiment shows that, on balance, voters’ reaction to Romney’s 
Mormonism was negative, recall that general impressions toward Mormons are a mixture 
of both positive and negative (and not every voter reacted negatively to Romney’s 
religion). We have found that two factors in particular foster a positive perception of 
Mormons: a close personal relationship with a Mormon and factual knowledge about 
Mormonism. We further have found that both close contact and factual knowledge also 
ameliorated, at least partially, the negative reaction to Romney’s Mormonism when he 
first appeared on the political scene in 2008.  
Figure 3 displays participants’ reaction to the description of Romney as an active 
Mormon among voters with low, medium, and high factual knowledge about 
Mormonism.8 Among those with low knowledge, when Romney was described as a 
Mormon, support for him dropped by 48 percentage points, compared to 36 points among 
those with a medium level of knowledge and 20 points among those with high 
knowledge. Even though greater knowledge “buffered” a negative reaction to Romney’s 
Mormonism—a 20-point drop is obviously less than a 48-point drop—it is still 
noteworthy that the reaction was negative across the board.  
Figure 3. Factual Knowledge about Mormonism (“Romney was a local leader in the 
Mormon Church.”) 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Source: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (2008). 
Figure 4 makes a similar comparison, but this time by the degree of reported 
social contact with a Mormon. Note that a moderate level of contact did more harm than 
good for attitudes about Romney. Among people with the least and most contact with 
Mormons, the negative reaction to Romney’s Mormonism was about the same—a drop of 
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roughly 20 percentage points in support—but among those in the middle (who knew a 
Mormon but only as an acquaintance), the effect was twice as large: a decline of 43 
percentage points.  
Figure 4. Contact with Mormons (“Romney was a local leader in the Mormon 
Church.”) 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Source: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (2008). 
These results reflect the reactions to Romney’s Mormonism in the absence of any 
further information, thus providing a baseline in the absence of the back-and-forth in a 
political campaign. Of course, political campaigns are designed to increase what voters 
know about a candidate, whether positive or negative. Just as important is how such 
information is framed. Scholars of framing effects distinguish between “frames in 
thought” and “frames in communication” (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman 2001). 
The former refers to what we might think of as a preexisting condition—the attitudes or 
opinions that people hold on a given matter. The latter refers to the way information on a 
given matter is presented in public discourse by the media, politicians, and other opinion 
shapers. Framing effects result from the interaction of the two. 
As shown by the way voters reacted upon reading of his involvement in the 
Mormon Church, Romney definitely faced negative frames in thought about Mormonism. 
Among these, one of the most potent is the claim that Mormons are not Christians. 
Evangelical Protestants, a key constituency in the Republican primaries, are especially 
likely to hold this belief. Labeling Mormons as non-Christians thus has potential political 
implications. A majority of Americans (and an even greater share of Republicans) believe 
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the United States was founded as a “Christian nation,” and thus may not want a non-
Christian to lead it (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2006). The presidency has 
quasi-religious trappings, as exemplified by the office’s many public ceremonies and 
patriotic rituals with religious undercurrents—examples of what Robert Bellah (1967) has 
aptly described as America’s civil religion.  
In comparison, countercurrents exist within the collective American psyche that 
could dampen, perhaps negate, any potential concern that Mormons are not Christians. 
To address those potential concerns, Romney introduced two counter-frames in his 
December 2007 speech “Faith in America.” The first echoed John F. Kennedy’s 
argument for religious tolerance in 1960, when he faced antagonism toward his 
Catholicism. Both Kennedy and Romney drew on the widespread frame in thought 
among Americans in favor of religious freedom, guaranteed by the separation of church 
and state. Romney consciously referenced Kennedy and argued that “a person should not 
be elected because of his faith nor should he be rejected because of his faith.” In doing 
so, he was tapping the deeply held American value of religious freedom. Call this the 
“separationist” counter-frame.  
Romney did not stop with deploying Kennedy’s argument about religious 
freedom. Unlike Kennedy, Romney felt he had to reassure religious conservatives that he 
shared their values, even if not the same theology, and that all religious communities 
supported a common moral perspective: 
There is one fundamental question about which I often am 
asked. What do I believe about Jesus Christ? I believe that 
Jesus Christ is the Son of God and the Savior of mankind. 
My church's beliefs about Christ may not all be the same as 
those of other faiths. . . . It is important to recognize that 
while differences in theology exist between the churches in 
America, we share a common creed of moral convictions. 
And where the affairs of our nation are concerned, it’s 
usually a sound rule to focus on the latter—on the great 
moral principles that urge us all on a common course. 
(Romney 2007) 
Call this the common-values counter-frame. 
We designed our experiment to test reactions to the frame that Mormons are 
not Christians, thus ensuring that what was a latent frame in thought among some 
voters was a frame in communication for all of the respondents in this particular 
treatment group. Accordingly, a random selection of subjects not only received the 
boilerplate biography of Romney and the information that he was a local leader in the 
Mormon Church but also read that “some people believe Mormons are not 
Christians.” Still another group of subjects received all of that information plus the 
separationist counter-frame: 
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Others say that Mitt Romney’s religion should not be an 
issue in the campaign, since a person’s faith should be 
irrelevant to politics. 
Yet another group received the common-values counter-frame: 
Others point out that Mormons believe in Jesus Christ, and 
that they have the same values as members of other faiths. 
Here, too, these statements would have been frames in thought for some of our 
respondents. By being articulated, they became frames in communication. 
Figure 5 displays how voters reacted to the frame and counter-frames. As 
expected, telling—or reminding—voters that Mormons are sometimes described as non-
Christians drove support down for Romney by roughly 30 percentage points. 
Interestingly, this is about the same reaction elicited by simply mentioning that Romney 
is an active Mormon. The two counter-frames lessened the negative reaction but did not 
neutralize it completely. In each case, hearing the “not Christian” frame followed by a 
counter-frame led to a drop in Romney’s support of about 20 percentage points—roughly 
10 points less than in those who were exposed to only the “not Christian” frame.  
Figure 5. Reaction to “Not Christian” Frame and Counter-Frames 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Source: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (2008). 
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As we would expect, evangelical Protestants had a stronger reaction to the “not 
Christian” frame than did the general public; their support for Romney dropped by 
roughly 40 points. Evangelicals were also largely not persuaded by the counter-frames. 
With the separationist counter-frame, Romney’s support among evangelicals dropped 32 
points. Evangelicals appeared to be a little more receptive to the common-values counter-
frame, as it led to a smaller decline, of 27 points.   
Political campaigns do not occur in a vacuum, as the information that circulates is 
filtered through voters’ own opinions and experiences. The real test of a frame in 
communication is how it interacts with frames in thought. We were interested in knowing 
how the impact of the not-Christian frame and the two counter-frames varied according 
to the ameliorating factors of knowledge about Mormonism and personal contact with 
Mormons.  
Figure 6 displays how voters reacted to the frame and two counter-frames 
according to their degree of factual knowledge about Mormonism. As expected, voters 
with the least information about Mormonism reacted most negatively upon reading the 
not-Christian frame (64 percentage points!). The counter-frames were partly 
ameliorative, with the common-values argument modestly more persuasive than the 
separationist argument. Among voters with medium information about Mormons, the 
counter-frames were more effective—the common-values frame weakened the negative 
reaction to the point that the reaction no longer met the threshold for statistical 
significance. For voters with a high level of knowledge, the counter-frames produce a 
muted response. Although the differences are slight, there is even a hint that the counter-
frames actually decreased support for Romney. The general pattern for the different 
levels of knowledge comports with our expectations. Less preexisting knowledge about 
Mormons meant that the information introduced through the campaign was novel, thus 
making a bigger splash and having a bigger effect. More knowledge meant that further 
information hardly made a wave. 
The pattern for social contact has a curvilinear pattern. As shown in panel 1 of 
Figure 7, people who did not know a Mormon reacted quite negatively to the information 
that Mormons may not be Christians (a drop of 29 percentage points), but upon hearing 
either counter-frame, their concerns were mostly assuaged, as the drop in support for 
Romney was slight and, in statistical terms, insignificant. (The counter-frames were 
equally effective.) Each frame and counter-frame made a splash, as they had little of the 
information gleaned from personal relationships. In contrast, people who had close 
contact with Mormons (panel 3, Figure 7) were hardly affected at all by the frame or the 
counter-frames—the slight negative effects were substantively small and statistically 
insignificant.9 These people had already made up their minds about Mormons, so the 
information presented in the experiment had little to no effect. We saw a very different 
result for people who had a moderate amount of contact with Mormons. They reacted 
negatively to the claim that Mormons are not Christians, but their likelihood of voting for 
Romney barely budged upon hearing either counter-frame.  
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Figure 6. Reaction to “Not Christian” Frame and Counter-Frames, by Knowledge 
of Mormonism 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Source: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (2008). 
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Figure 7. Reactions to “Not Christian” Frame and Counter-Frames, by Contact 
with Mormons 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
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Let us pause to summarize what we have learned thus far about voters’ reactions 
to information about Mitt Romney’s Mormonism, circa the 2008 primary season.  
1. Romney’s Mormonism mattered, and not in a good way. Identifying Romney 
as an active Mormon, not just an active churchgoer, produced a substantial 
negative drop in his support. In relative terms, the drop in Romney’s support 
was comparable to the negative effect of Obama’s association with Pastor 
Jeremiah Wright, an issue that threatened to derail Obama’s 2008 nomination 
bid. Specifically, framing Mormonism as a non-Christian religion triggers a 
negative reaction among voters; counter-framing only partially ameliorates 
that negative reaction. Importantly, in 2008, the information that Romney is a 
Mormon was novel, as many voters would have been unaware of that fact. 
More generally, few Mormons had run for president. Not since the 1968 
campaign of Mitt’s father, George Romney, had voters been faced with a 
Mormon presidential candidate who was both devout and viable.  
2. The more people knew about Mormonism, the less it concerned them. The 
Mormon effect was less among people with greater factual knowledge of 
Mormonism. Similarly, voters with the least factual information about 
Mormons had the strongest negative reaction to the frame that Mormons are 
not Christians. 
3. A little social contact leaves a big impression. People who had a moderate 
degree of contact with Mormons—who knew a Mormon in passing—had a 
stronger negative reaction to Romney’s Mormonism than people with either 
no contact or close contact. Like people with no contact, they evinced a strong 
negative reaction to the not-Christian frame; like those with close contact, 
their opinions were not affected by the counter-frames. We might call this a 
reverse-Goldilocks effect. In the fairy tale, Goldilocks always finds the middle 
option to be “just right.” For Romney, the people who had experienced 
middling contact with Mormons were his biggest problem.  
THE 2012 CAMPAIGN 
With these results from 2008 in mind, it might seem as though Romney’s 
Mormonism should have mattered a great deal to a great many voters in the 2012 
general election. After all, the degree of factual knowledge did not increase in 2012. 
Between 2010 and 2012, the average score on our Mormon knowledge quiz did not 
change substantially; the average score was 2.02 in 2010 and 2.17 in 2012. 
Likewise, using different measures, a Pew survey also found that factual knowledge 
about Mormons had not increased in 2012, in spite of countless media stories about 
the LDS Church and Mormon culture (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 
2012). Nor did we see an increase in self-reported contact with Mormons between 
2008 and 2012. In 2008, 15 percent had a close relationship with a Mormon. The 
number was 13 percent in 2010 and 14 percent in 2012—fluctuations all within the 
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margin of error.10 With a steady level of knowledge of and contact with Mormons, it 
might have appeared that Romney’s Mormonism would prove to be a big electoral 
liability. Many observers at the time expected as much. 
And yet it was not. To underscore that point, Figure 8 displays what happened 
when we replicated our original Romney experiment in October 2012, as Romney was in 
the closing stage of a heated Republican nomination contest.11 Everything about the 
experiment was the same,12 but while the direction of the results remained the same, the 
magnitude substantially decreased. In 2008, identifying Romney as a Mormon dropped 
his support by roughly 25 points for Republicans, 35 points for Independents, and 36 
points for Democrats. In 2012, the negative effect was about 12 percentage points for all 
three groups. 
Figure 8. Decline in Negative Effect of Romney's Mormonism (“Romney was a local 
leader in the Mormon Church.”) from 2008 to 2012 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Sources: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (2008); Mormon Perceptions Study (2012). 
We see an even more dramatic decline in the effect of the not-Christian frame. In 
particular, Figure 9 displays the change in effect for evangelical Protestants—a group that 
is both heavily Republican and most likely to consider Mormonism to be a non-Christian 
religion (see chapter 7). In 2008, the not-Christian frame caused a 40-point drop in 
Romney’s support among evangelicals and a 27-point decline among non-evangelicals. 
By the 2012 general election, it had no statistically significant effect on either 
evangelicals or non-evangelicals.  
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Figure 9. Cessation of Effect, Even among Evangelicals, of the Claim That Mormons 
Are Not Christians 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Sources: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (2008); Mormon Perceptions Study (2012). 
In other words, our experiments reinforce the story told by the analysis of how 
attitudes toward Mormons affected the 2012 presidential vote. There may have been an 
effect, but it was small and likely inconsequential.  
What explains the “case of the disappearing Mormon effect”? There is little 
mystery. In early 2008, voters were still forming an opinion about Romney, as he was in 
his first national campaign. By late 2012, voters had been exposed to a slew of 
information about Romney—first as he ran the gauntlet of the Republican primaries, then 
as the GOP nominee. When we did our survey in October of 2012, only weeks before 
election day, most voters had learned enough about Romney to have made up their minds 
about him. For many voters, information about Romney’s religion was no longer novel. 
As just one indication that voters had undergone a learning process, in 2008, about half of 
our respondents could correctly identify Romney’s religion. By the fall of 2012, this had 
risen to 68 percent,13 although it is worth noting that this still means that even when the 
presidential campaign had its greatest salience, roughly 1 in 3 Americans did not know 
that Romney is Mormon.  
Thus, any bits of information we included in our vignettes were small pebbles, 
leaving barely a ripple. This is not to say that Romney’s Mormonism had no effect on 
voters’ attitudes toward him; rather, by the time of the general election, those voters who 
cared about his religious background had already incorporated that information into their 
assessment of him. This is similar to the way that investors account for the available 
Campbell  Stained-Glass Ceiling  17 
information about a firm when trading its stock. At any given point in time, the stock 
price reflects what investors know about that company. In the case of the 2012 election, 
most Republicans who may have been inclined toward a negative reaction to Romney’s 
Mormonism were more concerned with ousting President Obama from the White House.  
To summarize what we have learned from our analysis of the 2012 
presidential election: 
1. Novelty wears off. In the 2008 Republican primaries, Romney was largely 
unknown; thus, information about him—particularly his membership in an 
“exotic” religion—had a large effect on voters’ perceptions. By the general 
election of 2012, however, Romney had become a household name. 
Accordingly, the novelty of learning about his background, including, and 
perhaps especially, about his religion, had worn off. 
2. Context matters. In the 2012 general election, Romney was no longer one 
among many Republican hopefuls vying for the party’s presidential 
nomination. He had become the party’s standard-bearer against a Democratic 
president with exceedingly low approval among Republicans. When given a 
choice between a dislike for Obama and a dislike of Mormonism, the former 
overwhelmed the latter. 
We should not dismiss the significance of the diminishing impact of Romney’s 
Mormonism the longer he was in the public eye, as it suggests that many voters had no 
problem voting for a Mormon in the context of the 2012 election—even those voters with 
theological concerns about Mormonism. Although a small majority of voters chose 
Obama over Romney in 2012, the vast majority of that majority did so for political, not 
theological, reasons. We find it especially telling that our 2012 experiment shows that 
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents alike all had a similarly mild reaction to the 
description of Romney as a devout Mormon. While the decision to vote for Romney was 
largely determined by voters’ partisanship, reactions to his Mormonism were the same 
regardless of party.  
DID MITT ROMNEY AFFECT ATTITUDES TOWARD MORMONS? 
Throughout 2011 and 2012, Mormonism was subject to extensive public attention—so 
much so that pundits regularly began referring to the “Mormon Moment” (Bowman 
2012). In journalistic parlance, a “news hole” opened up for stories about all things 
Mormon. There were articles about fashion among LDS hipsters (Williams 2011), 
Mormon cuisine (Moskin 2012) and, of course, The Book of Mormon musical on 
Broadway (Zoglin 2011). In the course of reporting on Mitt Romney’s biography, 
journalists introduced many Americans to numerous aspects of Mormonism, including 
his time as a missionary in France (Evans 2012), his temple marriage to Ann (Kantor 
2012), his considerable financial contributions to the LDS Church (Podhoretz 2012), and 
his service as an LDS leader at both the local (bishop) and regional (stake president) 
levels (Ertl 2012). Although we have already seen that this media attention did not lead to 
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an increase in knowledge about Mormonism, the media attention to all things LDS 
suggests that public attitudes toward Mormons might have changed.  
At first blush, it would appear that they have not. In our 2008 survey, 49 percent 
had a very favorable opinion of Mormons and 7 percent had an opinion that was very 
favorable. In 2012, 51 percent had a favorable opinion while 8 percent were very 
favorable—increases so small as to fall within the margin of error. Likewise, between 
2007 and 2012, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that the percentage of 
Americans who said that Mormons are not Christians had remained at 31 percent.14  
Similarly, the general perception of Mormons held steady.15 Panel 1 of Figure 10 
displays the nearly flat line in general perceptions of Mormons, as measured on a 0–100 
scale, from 2006—before Mitt Romney entered the political stage—to 2012.16 A closer 
look reveals, however, that a notable change has occurred in the distribution of opinions 
about Mormons. In the second panel of Figure 10, we break out how Republicans, 
Democrats, and Independents have each perceived Mormons over the period from 2006 
to 2012. In 2006, there were no partisan differences; Mormons received the same rating 
across the party spectrum. By 2012, a wide party gap had opened. Republicans became 
more much favorable toward Mormons, Independents became slightly more favorable, 
and Democrats became sharply less favorable.  
Like an object being acted on by equal and opposing forces, the net result was that 
the overall attitude toward Mormons did not move. Likewise, the Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life found that between 2011 and 2012, Republicans became more likely to 
offer a positive one-word impression of Mormons, while Democrats became less likely.17 
Republicans also became more likely to say that their religion has “a lot in common” 
with Mormon beliefs, while Democrats did not change (Pew Forum on Religion and 
Public Life 2012). In chapter 8, we found a similar pattern with Gallup survey data on 
support for a generic Mormon candidate. 
In our politically polarized times, perhaps we should not be surprised that 
attitudes toward the religion of the Republican presidential nominee would split along 
party lines. When so much in American society takes on political meaning, why not the 
perceptions of a religion, especially the religion of the Republican presidential nominee? 
Whether a matter of surprise or not, the partisan inflection in attitudes toward 
Mormons complicate our assessment of the 2012 presidential election, for although Mitt 
Romney’s Mormonism did not, in the end, have much of a direct effect on the 
presidential vote, this does not mean that Mormonism has ceased to matter at the polls. 
Another experiment indicates that Mormon candidates for other offices risk a negative 
reaction to their religion. In the fall of 2012, we tested people’s likelihood of voting for a 
mayoral or gubernatorial candidate when he was and was not identified as a Mormon.18 
As in the Romney experiment, we provided a baseline boilerplate biography of a 
fictitious candidate and then in the experimental group added that the candidate was 
active in the Mormon Church.  
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Figure 10. Overall, general perceptions of Mormons have (a) held steady while (b) 
the general perception of Mormons has become politically polarized. 
 
(a)   
    
(b)    
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Figure 11. More Partisan Polarization: Democrats Much Less Likely to Vote for 
Mormon Candidates (“Candidate is ‘an active member of the Mormon 
Church.’”) 
 
Note: A black border represents a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Source: Mormon Perceptions Study (2012). 
Is the Mormon effect among Democrats because of religious bigotry? Not 
necessarily. With limited information about these hypothetical candidates, including 
no party label, most Democrats likely inferred that this candidate was a Republican. 
After all, the Republicans’ presidential nominee was Mormon, and as can be seen in 
chapters 4 and 5 of our book, Mormons are mostly Republicans and generally 
conservative. Similarly, Mormons’ highly publicized and tightly organized movement 
to muster support for California’s Proposition 8 has likely also contributed to the 
perception of Mormons as politically active social conservatives squarely under the 
Republican umbrella—and of course, the 2012 Republican presidential nominee was a 
Mormon as well.  
These inferences are not merely hypothetical, as we have empirical confirmation 
that voters are largely aware of Mormons’ Republican-ness. In the same 2012 survey, we 
asked our respondents whether members of different religious groups are Republicans, 
Democrats, or “an even mix of both.” As many people describe Mormons as “mostly 
Republicans” (59 percent) as say the same about evangelicals (61 percent), the latter 
often referred to as the base of the Republican Party.  
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CONCLUSION 
I conclude by returning to the question I posed at the beginning: Is Mitt Romney the 
Mormons’ John F. Kennedy or Al Smith? Superficially, he resembles Smith. After all, 
both lost. The data we have presented in this chapter, however, suggest that Romney 
resembles Kennedy after all—or at least his 2012 run for the White House was more like 
1960 than 1928. During his first presidential run in 2008, Romney’s Mormonism was 
definitely a drag on his political support. Although Americans highly knowledgeable 
about Mormonism or who had close relationships with Mormons expressed little concern 
about his religion, such people were in relatively short supply, but in 2012, Romney’s 
Mormonism faded as an issue. In not winning the presidency, he may not have broken 
through the stained-glass ceiling, but perhaps he made it more like an open window. 
Romney was a Mormon candidate who lost a presidential election, not the candidate who 
lost because he was Mormon. The difference is significant. 
Mormonism did not cost Mitt Romney the presidency in 2012, but his presidential 
bid has shaped attitudes toward Mormonism. Although Romney’s time on the national 
stage did not lead to greater knowledge of the LDS religion nor a change in whether 
Mormons are thought to be Christians, it did lead to a sharp partisan divide in how 
Mormons are perceived. They rose in favor among Republicans and fell in the eyes of 
Democrats. Romney leaves a legacy of intensifying partisan relevance for Mormonism; 
whether this legacy lasts remains to be seen.  
ENDNOTES 
1. These data come from Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project 2008.  
2. Specifically, the experiment ran from January 24 to February 4, although 90 percent 
of the surveys were completed by January 28. Romney dropped out of the race on 
February 7.  
3. All of these results omit Mormons.  
4. Results are similar for respondents with high versus low religiosity.  
5. Below are the full descriptions of the candidates used in the experiments.  
 
As you know, Hillary Clinton is running for president. She is a graduate of 
Yale Law School and the former First Lady. She is currently a U.S. 
Senator, representing the state of New York. She has been married for 
thirty-two years and raised a daughter. Hillary Clinton has also been an 
active layperson in the United Methodist church.  
 
As you know, Mike Huckabee is running for president. He is a former 
governor of Arkansas. In 2003, he lost 110 pounds after being diagnosed 
with Type II diabetes and is a spokesman for living a healthy lifestyle. He 
has been married for thirty-three years and raised three sons. Mike 
Huckabee has also been an ordained Southern Baptist pastor. 
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As you know, Barack Obama is running for president. He is a former 
community organizer in Chicago and a best-selling author. He is currently 
a U.S. Senator, representing the state of Illinois. He has been married for 
sixteen years and has two daughters. Barack Obama is a member of the 
Trinity United Church of Christ. (1) Some people have said his church is 
hostile to Whites and promotes Black separatism. (2) Some people have 
said that he must be a Muslim, because his paternal grandfather was a 
Muslim.  
 
6. The survey was fielded from March 21 to April 9, 2008, after the controversy over 
Obama’s pastor had become national news and Obama had delivered a very high-
profile speech in response to the controversy. He gave that speech on March 18, 
2008.  
7. Likewise, we see virtually the same results for self-described voters in Republican 
versus Democratic primaries.  
8. The quiz of factual knowledge about Mormonism in 2008 differed from the one in 
2010, discussed in chapter 7. The 2998 test consisted of four true-false questions, 
which provided little differentiation (i.e., the test was too easy). Specifically, the quiz 
was worded: 
 
Of the following statements about practicing members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, indicate which are true: 
 
Practice polygamy (have more than one wife) [False] 
Do not drink alcohol [True] 
Give 10% of their income to their church [True] 
Do not believe in the Bible [False] 
 
9. The cell sizes are small, so statistical significance is not very informative. 
10. These figures come from the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, and the 
2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies.  
11. We ran our experiment on the 2012 Mormon Perceptions Study, which is described in 
Appendix 1 of Seeking the Promised Land (Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014).  
12. The biography was exactly the same, except that we updated the number of years that 
Mitt and Ann Romney had been married.  
13. A December 2012 Pew survey found a nearly identical 65 percent of Americans 
could identify Romney’s religion; however, a November 2011 Pew survey found that 
only 39 percent of Americans could identify Romney’s religion. We found a higher 
percentage in 2008. The difference could be that some voters could recall Romney’s 
religion in the midst of the 2008 primary race but it slipped their minds by the fall of 
2011. It could also be that the sample drawn for the online Cooperative Campaign 
Analysis Project 2008 was more politically knowledgeable than the sample drawn for 
the Pew telephone surveys. It could also be because we used different standards for 
determining a correct answer, or it could be because of sampling variability.  
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14. In the surveys we have conducted, we have actually found a slight increase in the 
percentage saying that Mormons are not Christians, from 36 percent (2008) to 43 
percent (2010) to 41 percent (2012). Our results differ from Pew surveys in 2007, 
2011 and 2012, at least in part because Pew uses telephone surveys while we 
administered ours online. The Pew surveys have a sizeable fraction of “don’t know” 
responses, because in a telephone survey, respondents can easily volunteer that they 
do not know the answer, whereas our online survey did not have an explicit “don’t 
know” option. In 2012, 18 percent of Pew survey respondents said they did not know 
whether Mormons are Christians, compared to 16 percent in 2011 and 17 percent in 
2007. When we put our results alongside Pew’s, we can either conclude that the 
percentage of Americans who think Mormons are not Christians stayed the same 
(Pew) or increased slightly (our data). Either way, the percentage did not decrease. 
See Appendix 1 of Campbell et al. (2014) for details of the 2007, 2011, and 2012 Pew 
surveys. 
15. For more on perceptions of religious groups measured this way, see American Grace: 
How Religion Divides and Unites Us (Putnam and Campbell 2010). 
16. The flat line is especially noteworthy given that these data came from different 
surveys and are thus subject to the vagaries of what are known in the polling business 
as house effects, or variations in sampling, question wording, weighting, and so on 
that produce systematic differences across survey research firms.  
17. Specifically, 23 percent of Republicans offered a positive one-word response in 
November 2011, compared to 35 percent in December 2012. Among Democrats, the 
percentage of positive responses dropped from 26 percent to 19 percent.  
18. Respondents were assigned to either the mayoral or gubernatorial experiment. 
Wording for the full experimental treatments is provided below. The text in bold was 
not included in the description given to the control group.  
 
Jim Anderson is running for mayor/governor of a mid-sized city/state close 
to yours. He is forty-two years old, married, and a father of three school-
age children. He started a successful local real estate company. He has also 
been the president of the local Rotary Club and is an active member of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, also known as the 
Mormon Church. Anderson was re-elected twice to the state legislature.  
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